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Now consider a regular human
being. Take Bob the builder (as-
sume he is a human being).
Clearly, a builder does
something, he builds a house.
And something that makes
things must be an agent. Also hu-
mans have a biological makeup
and satisfy some rationality re-
quirements. Often they can even
be called reasonable.
Can a human be an agent?
This agent might only be
called "agent". Until he
breaks free he is controlled
by the Matrix. Agent Smith
does what the matrix tells
him. He is an agent in the sense of
principal-agent theory in econmics.
Not being free to choose he executes
or implements someone else's plans.
Is he really an agent?
Tick according to your intu-
itions. Can it be an agent?
Consider Wall-E, the ro-
bot. Supposedly it can per-
form all the cognitive and
emotive processes humans
can perform. It can fall in love!
Clearly, however, it lacks any simil-
arity to human agents with regard
to its material makeup. It's a ma-
chine!
Can the robot still be an agent?
It might sound odd that an or-
dinary chicken is an agent. Con-
sider however: animal behaviour
can be complex. Just think of the
clever ways in which birds obtain
food! Or think of your dog. We ascribe
beliefs and desires to animals
to make sense of them. Also
they have a biological makeup
just similar to ours.
Can a chicken or a dog be an
agent?
A group Information Search Information Exchange Aggregation Implementation
There are five steps in a process to
group agency.
First you need a group. This is usu-
ally a collection of individuals.
However, it is also more than that. For
example, if you replace two individual
members by two others, is it still the
same group? If your answer is yes,
then there seems to be more to what
makes a group than its individual
members.
Unfortunately, these are two diffi-
cult questions in one: metaphysics of
groups, and identity over time!
Before making a decision, members in
a group search for information. Their
success depends on how the individu-
als search (will they work together?)
and what the information looks like (it
could be like a jigsaw where each indi-
vidual finds a piece but you only get
the full picture once you put the differ-
ent pieces together).
Questions like these are issues in
epistemology, in particular in social
epistemology, which now is taken to
be a seperate field within "the study of
knowledge".
Consider an academic tenure commit-
tee. Each committee member has re-
viewed the application and searched
for information about the applicant.
Then you meet and discuss and delib-
erate. Deliberation is one very com-
mon way of exchanging information.
There are good formal models of
information exchange and information
updating for individuals and groups.
Research into such models is also a
topic in social epistemology.
Now it is time to make a decision: will
Dr. Goofy be promoted to Prof.
Goofy? This could be decided by vot-
ing. However, on what to vote is not
straight-forward. Do you only vote on
whether the applicant should be pro-
moted? Or do you consider whether
Dr. Goofy meets each of the different
requirements?
A group's decision is very sensitive
to its aggregation (or voting) proced-
ure. This is the driving topic in Social
Choice Theory and Judgment Ag-
gregation.
Now the decision must be implemen-
ted. This can be done by the chairman
of the committee who will send the
promotion to Dr. Goofy. The chairmain
acts on behalf of the group. Boards in
companies have spokespersons to
speak on their behalf.
The phenomenon of “acting on
someone's behalf” might not seem
very far-fetched. However, existing
conceptions of action in philosophy
struggle to accomodate this.
Collective Agency
Can the state be an agent? (Can the state be a person?)
Topic
This is a PhD research project in philo-
sophy. It investigates two concepts
that are central to philosophy:
1. Agency,
2. Personhood.
Roughly speaking an agent is a
thing that does something. A person
is a moral agent, i.e. something that
has rights and duties and can be sub-
ject to praise and blame.
Concepts
Philosophy often deals with:
• Concepts: the general idea.
• Conceptions, which spell the idea
out in greater detail.
The concept is that “agency”
means “doing something”. That's not
good enough for philosophers. They
will ask “What does that mean: ‘doing
something’? Will I have to move my
arm for that?”. An answer to such
questions will be a conception of
agency.
One short answer might be: “An
agent is a thing that has beliefs and
desires and that acts such that its de-
sires are met.”
Example
Assume you want to have a coffee
(your desire) and you know that they
sell coffee at the Garrick (your belief),
you might go to the Garrick and buy
yourself an Americano (your action).
This belief-desire model is the
humean conception of agency named
after David Hume. There are other
conceptions of agency, which might
talk about consciousness or "the self".
Relevance
Discussions about conceptions can
appear tedious. You know, philosoph-
ers don't really answer questions,
ever. Nevertheless, those discussions
are often important.
First, they are important for explan-
ations. Whatever you want to explain
in the social sciences, you want to
know how a certain phenomenon
came about. You ask: Who did it? This
is the question of agency.
Secondly, you want to blame your
class teacher for wasting your time.
However, she can only be responsible
for something she actually did. What
did she do in wasting your time? This
is where agency comes in. Before
holding somebody responsible, it
needs to be clear what action is we
are talking about. To talk about action
means talking about agency. So
agency seems in a way prior to re-
sponsibility.
Methods
Philosophy is actually similar to maths.
You stipulate premises, assumptions,
and conditions to produce results.
However, the methods philosophers
use and the things that they let go into
their arguments are not only philo-
sophical. Intuitions or findings from
other sciences play a role in argu-
ments. This PhD project is interdiscip-
linary in borrowing from models of
Soical Choice Theory, multi-agent-
models, or models in theoretical bio-
logy.
Summary
Philosophers investigate concepts. This project runs different conceptions of
agency against each other and applies them to groups.
Weighing arguments from proponents of different conceptions might appear
tedious.
Nevertheless, there is something at stake. Even though a concept like
agency seems far removed from our everyday lives, it does figure into other
concepts that we employ. It is central to explanations in the social sciences and
in ethics it is a precondition for responsibility.
Philosophical methodProject outline
Observation
What is a state doing? What rights
does a state have? In philosophy, the
former (doing something) refers to
agency. The latter (having rights) refers
to personhood.
Observation: We ascribe actions
and rights to states. The relation of
group-actions and group-rights to
individual actions and individual
rights is, however, not clear.
Examples
• Germany bailing out Greece.
• “China sends woman into space”.
• Realist school in IR takes takes
states to be agents.
• States claim sovereignty and self-
determination.
• States claim right to levy taxes.
Problem
Two challenges from this observation:
1st Understanding individual-group
relationship.
2nd Fitting philosophical concep-
tions of personhood and agency to
groups.
On the first: There are two oppos-
ing camps on this issue. One emphas-
ises the individual, the properties of
which are taken as primitive. The other
emphasises the group. The study of
complex systems with “emergent”
properies might provide formalisations
that are able to combine both.
Approach
On the second challenge: Philosophic-
al conceptions of agency and person-
hood are difficult to be applied to
groups. However, in daily life and in
many academic disciplines we readily
explain or justify the actions of states.
This requires an investigation, and
possibly a revision of the philosophical
conceptions. It will proceed in three
steps. The first step is to clarify the
philosophical conceptions, i.e. analys-
ing them into their central assump-
tions. Those assumptions form sets of
necessary and sufficient conditions.
The second step is to see if those as-
sumptions are well founded. What jus-
tifies these necessary or sufficient
conditions for agency or personhood?
Or in other words: what is an agent
sensibly construed? The third step
asks the question: can groups meet
these revised conceptions of agency
and personhood? The third step sees,
as it were, how these conceptions can
be applied in practice. It would mean
giving in account of what it means to
say that the state is doing something,
or that the state has the right to
something. This is the aim of this PhD
project.
Research
This project pursues two research
questions.
Positive question: what concep-
tions of agency and personhood
are possible candidates to be ap-
plied to the state?
Normative question: which of
these conceptions of agency and
personhood should a state imple-
ment?
Summary
An explanation of the state faces two philosophical challenges:
1st challenge: Complexity of relationship between individual and group.
2nd challenge: Philosophical conceptions seem deficient.
On the first: Requires formalisation. Possibly: Multi-Agent-Models, Social Choice.
On the second: Expound and adapt conceptions to fit to groups in three steps.
1. Clarify conceptions into necessary and sufficient conditions.
2. Evaluate conceptions, are all conditions justified?
3. Apply conceptions to groups, can they be made to fit?
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By the way
This guy is the Leviathan as pictured on an early
editon of Thomas Hobbes' book. It represents
the state. Note how in this illustration the state is
made up of many individuals.
